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Draft Recommendation
on WEU's activities 
- 
Reply to the forty-first annual report of the Council
The Assembly,
(i) Deploring that it received the second part of the forty-first annual report of the Council so late that
it was impossible for the Assembly committees to examine it;
(ii) Regretting furthermore the lack of substance in the Birmingham Declaration, dated 7 May 1996,
which confines itself to describing the role of WEU in the context of the Maastricht Treaty and the NATO
summit Declaration of January 1994 and makes no reference to the original obligations of WEU and its
member countries, such as they are stipulated by the modified Brussels Treaty;
(iii) Regretting the absence of any substantial progress on most of the Council's plans, such as:
- 
the drafting of a European White Paper on security and defence;
- 
the development of its relations with the associate members, associate partners and observers;
- 
the transformation of the WEU Institute for Security Studies into an academy;
- 
cooperation on armaments;
(ir,'1 Welcoming, on the other hand, the fact that the ministers meeting in the WEU Council reaffirmed their
resolve to contribute fully to the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty;
(r,) Recalling in this respect Assembly Recommendations 588,589 and 590 and Decision l4 on the
organisation of security in Europe, which was adopted at its extraordinary session in London;
(vi) Desirous that cooperation and contacts between the Assembly and the Council should be consid-
erably strengthened throughout the period of the intergovernmental conference;
(t'ii) Considering that signature of the security agreement and the agreement on the concept of CJTF
opens up the prospect of new relations between WEU and NATO,
REconattgNos rHAT rHE CouNctr-
1. Give effect to its intention to contribute fully to the intergovernmental conference on the revision of
the Maastricht Treaty and, to that end, adopt a specific approach and not envisage any project designed to
subordinate WEU to the European Union for as long as the two organisations are based on separate trea-
ties and do not have the same member countries:
2. Inform the Assembly every two months, starting from I July 1996, about the content of all meetings
of the intergovernmental conference that concern:
(a) the future of WEU and its Assembly;
(b) development of the CFSP and institutional issues;
(c) the parliamentary dimension;
3. Do more to project itself within the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance as an organisation
which produces political impetus and, where necessary, plays a precursor role;
4. Draw up, on the basis of the new type of relations established between WEU and NATO as a result
of the conclusion of the security agreement and the agreement on the concept of CJTF, new formulas for
cooperation and coordination between the two organisations, which shall include the Assembly of WEU;
5. Develop and strengthen WEU's operational capabilities, particularly in the areas of planning,logis-
tics, strategic lift, intelligence, space-based observation and the joint production of armaments so that
WEU can make an effective contribution to supply Europe, in due course, with the means for a common
defence policy, and even a common defence, in accordance with Article J.4. i of the Maastricht Treatyl
6. Study the transformation of the Institute for Security Studies into an analysis and forecasting centre
comparable to the one planned for the CFSP;
7. Keep the promises it has repeatedly given to convey its annual reports to the Assembly sufficiently
early for the latter and its committees to study them.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Urbain, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. This is not the first time a rapporteur to the
Assembly has had difficulty in evaluating WEU's
activities because of the scant information the
Council has provided the Assembly and the late
date on which it has conveyed to it the annual
report. At the time of writing, the second part of
the Council's 4lst annual report has still not rea-
ched the Assembly. That part of the report should
cover the Council's activities between 1 July and
31 December 1995, a period now largely over-
taken by events. What is more, the first part of the
report covering the first half of 1995', which your
Rapporteur could use as a source of information
on the Council's activities, has lost all topica-
lity.
2. The Assembly's extraordinary session in
London on22 and 23 February this year provided
it with an opportunity for an intensive and thor-
ough debate on the situation in which WEU found
itself on the eve of the opening of the intergovern-
mental conference on the revision of the Maas-
tricht Treaty and a few months away from the next
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council
in Berlin which is due to take decisions on, among
other things, the details of an agreement between
NATO and WEU on the CJTF. The texts adopted
at the Assembly's extraordinary session clarified
its position as regards WEU's future role in the
European and Atlantic context. In contrast, the
Council confined its contribution to the intergo-
vernmental conference to a presentation of a num-
ber of options since it had been unable to agree
beforehand on any one of them.
3. The present report will therefore concen-
trate of the situation that has developed since the
opening of the intergovernmental conference in
Turin on 29 March 1996.lt will take into consid-
eration the information the United Kingdom Pre-
sidency gave the Presidential Committee on
I April in London, and the outcome of the WEU
meeting of the Council of Ministers in Birmin-
gham on 7 May, which is summarised in the Bir-
mingham Declaration.
4. As things stand, Western European Union
is obliged to consider its future mainly for reasons
extraneous to the Organisation. Irrespective of
opinions that have occasionally been expressed to
the contrary, Article XII of the modified Brussels
Treaty places no time limit on the Treaty and
merely provides for the right, after 50 years have
elapsed. for those countries wishing to do so, to
withdraw from it giving one year's notice of
denunciation. As far as your Rapporteur is aware,
no country intends to avail itself of that right. In
fact, many countries are candidates for accession
and there is nothing to suggest that WEU is likely
to cease to exist in 1998 or at any other time.
5. However, the evolution both of NATO and
the European Union will have major conse-
quences for Western European Union as WEU is
closely tied to NATO when it comes to forces
deployment and to the European Union inasmuch
as the latter is seeking to define a common foreign
and security policy. But the new directions both
those organisations are to take are at present the
subject of discussions between partners. the out-
come of which it is impossible to predict.
6. Nevertheless, it has to be remembered that
the future of WEU does not depend exclusively
on how NATO and the European Union will deve-
lop but also on its own determination and the poli-
tical will of its leaders: are they ready to give it a
clear direction and remit? As far as the Organisa-
tion's determination is concerned, the first obs-
tacle is that of the differences that exist between
its member countries, precisely as regards the
remit and direction it should be given. In this res-
pect the Assembly has a major responsibility: it
must continue to work out positions common to as
many of its members as possible and endeavour to
win acceptance for a joint stance in the parlia-
ments, general public and governments of the
countries concerned. The extent to which the rele-
vant ministries, and above all political leaders, are
familiar with the Assembly's reports and recom-
mendations varies considerably from one member
country to another. But one often has the distinct
impression that the content of these documents is
better known outside WEU member countries
than within them.
II. WEU and NATO
7 . Five major questions can at present be
asked as regards NAIO:
8. (a) Will NATO continue to be primarily a
collective defence organisation that is based
essentially on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
and whose prime purpose is to counter threats toI. Document 1499
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Europe as a whole? Clearly, the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact, followed by the break-up of the
Soviet Union, have wrought profound changes in
the nature of that threat. However the present poli-
tical instability in Russia, the predilection it seems
to exhibit for rebuilding in one form or another a
political entity reflecting the legacy left by the
USSR and the very firm opposition it has regis-
tered to any eastward territorial expansion of
NATO give the lie to the suggestion that threats no
longer exist.
9. In this connection, the result of the presi-
dential elections which are to be held in Russia in
June 1996 may perhaps shed some light on the
reactions of Russian society and the ambitions of
any new government to emerge from them. It is
most unlikely. in view of the information that can
be gleaned about the election campaign, that the
outcome will provide clear answers to the ques-
tions the West must address.
10. (b) The countries of central Europe that
have left the Warsaw Pact have expressed a wish
to join NAIO, in order to obtain a better guarantee
of their security. NATO must therefore consider
whether to admit some or all of these countries.
By admitting all of them. it would commit itself to
extending its defence system to a huge area of
central Europe, the effect of which would be to
fuel Russia's opposition and increase the pressure
it is exerting on the CIS countries to induce them
to return to its own defence system. If NATO were
to expand to include certain countries, for
example the four Visegrad countries, but not
others. it would run the risk of sending Russia a
dangerous signal to the effect that the fate of the
latter countries, especially the Baltic states, was
not a matter of concern to it 
- 
which would not
strengthen European security as a whole. Lastly, if
NATO declines to give any guarantee to the cen-
tral European countries. it runs the risk of prompt-
ing some of them to seek guarantees from Russia,
thus increasing tensions in central Europe by
recreating the antagonism that led to the cold war.
11. The 1996 election period in the United
States does nothing to facilitate US decision-
making as regards a possible enlargement of
NATO. The US undoubtedly has a decisive role in
the organisation but considerable electoral pres-
sure is being brought to bear by certain national
minorities with an interest in the issue. It seems
unlikely that any decision on accession to NAIO
by central European countries will be forth-
coming before 1997. Moreover in Europe itself,
Germany's oft-stated intention that at least some
of the central and eastern European countries
should be incorporated into western institutions as
a whole, would appear to run counter to concern
on the part of France and the United Kingdom that
NATO's defence commitment should remain
intact, thus ruling out any premature enlargement.
12. (c)The role that NATO can and should play
in the organisation of a security system involving
Europe as a whole, and possibly other regions,
particularly those bordering on the Mediterra-
nean, is not defined by the North Atlantic Treaty.
Practice over the last ten years, involving inter-
vention in the Gulf, Somalia and former Yugosla-
via, has shown that the United States had no pre-
conceived intention of extending its military
commitments but wished to secure the support of
its allies for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement
operations in which it took part under ad hoc
arrangements. which does not make it easy to
establish task-sharing between WEU and NATO
in advance.
13. (d) The present period of budget austerity
in both Europe and the United States has led to
considerable reductions in the permanent forces
of the Alliance. Such reductions have occurred at
a time when, undeniably, the risk of major conflict
is much reduced, but when NATO can neverthe-
less only act as guarantor of peace in Europe if
capable of rapid and substantial force deploy-
ment. Despite these difficulties, such deployment
has proved possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina
within the planned time frame but a number of
differences between the allies is throwing a sha-
dow over IFOR operations. They concern the
duration, nature and objectives of the mission but
also the United States' intention to supply arms to
the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, an issue which is examined in more
detail in the report submitted by Mr Roseta on
" The peace process in the Balkans 
- 
implementa-
tion of the Dayton Accords ". It can be inferred
that where NATO intervenes outside the scope of
Article 5. the conduct of joint activities raises
extensive difficulties likely to jeopardise not
merely the operation under way but the very cohe-
sion of the Alliance.
14. (e) The difficulties encountered in imple-
menting the agreement reached in the NATO
Council, in January 1994, for the establishment,
organisation and deployment of multilateral
forces (CJTF) mainly for peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement tasks under either NATO or
WEU auspices, have revealed a fundamental prob-
lem that is hampering relations between NATO
and Europe. The United States, understandably,
does not under any circumstances want NATO to
be party to operations over which the US does not
have both political and military control for fear of
finding itself involved without its consent in mili-
tary adventures that are dubious or are repudiated
by American public opinion. A solution appears
to be in the process of being worked out and
should take the form of a new agreement in the
June 1996 NATO Council of Ministers on defi-
ning NMO/WEU relations in the event of NATO
not taking responsibility directly for operations
undertaken by the CJTF. NATO assets in terms of
DOCUMENT 1527
logistics and command might be made available
to these forces, which would naturally use NAIO
procedures, but such operations would be sanction-
ed only by express decision of the NATO Council.
thus subordinating any military action by Europe
to prior authorisation by the United States. There
is no certainty that such a solution would be
accepted unreservedly by certain European part-
ners in the Alliance. Nevertheless, there appears
to be optimism in WEU that the North Atlantic
Council will be able to take a decision on the com-
bined joint task forces on 3 June in Berlin. In any
event, experts from the 16 member countries rea-
ched agreement on 24 Aprll on the concept that
should be adopted by the ministerial meeting in
Berlin. It would seem that differences between
Washington and Paris about arrangements for the
integrated military structure being used for the
Europeans' purposes have been ironed out and
that a compromise was recently found at the
highest level '.
15. It appears that France's decision henceforth
to attend meetings of defence ministers within the
framework of the Atlantic Alliance, re-occupy its
seat in the Military Committee, and improve its
working relations with the supreme headquarters
of the allied powers in Europe was taken precisely
to facilitate agreement on affangements for imple-
menting the CJTF.
16. In the same context. the fact that it has at
last been possible, after two years of negotiations,
for NAIO and WEU to sign a " security agree-
ment " designed to facilitate the transmission of
confidential information from NAIO to WEU, is
to be welcomed. According to the press, the infor-
mation in question will include military intelli-
gence as well as NAIO procedures, which could
be used by WEU in the event of it conducting an
operation with the support of military assets sup-
plied by the Alliance.
17.(f) France's return to the fold as regards cer-
tain NATO military structures, the consequences
of which for WEU have been the subject of a good
deal of speculation, was described in the foll-
owing terms by the French Prime Minister.
Mr Jupp6, when addressing the National Assem-
bly on 20 March:
" Our vision of the Atlantic Alliance is a
European one. There is no contradiction in
this 
- 
on the contrary. Since the conclusion
of the Treaty on European Union and the
declaration the Atlantic Alliance heads of
state and of government issued at their
summit meeting in Brussels in January
1994, and since 1995 when the President of
the Republic spelt out the course to be fol-
lowed. we have not ceased to state that the
development of Europe's political and mili-
tary capabilities and the strengthening of
what, for lack of a more simple term. is call-
ed the European pillar of NATO, are two
facets of the same policy. Moreover. the
Declaration by the WEU countries,
annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, states
that " WEU will be developed as the
defence component of the European Union
and as a means to strengthen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance ". European
defence will not be built outside the
Alliance and, even less so, against it. At the
same time, of course, we want Europeans
to begin to agree within the European
Union on what should be a joint approach
for a European defence policy. And we are
gradually getting there.
The policy defined by the President of the
Republic is wholly in line with these prin-
ciples. The purpose of the gestures France
made on 5 December in the North Atlantic
Council is to enable us to take part in a real
renovation of the Alliance at a crucial time
in its existence. At a time when we are learn-
ing the lessons of the end of the cold war
and when the principle of expansion of the
European Union and NATO has been
accepted, who would understand it if
France were to keep out of the reform of the
Alliance's political and military bodies that
is being prepared? Especially since it was
France that wanted and requested it!
The new configuration that will result will
provide the equation for European security
for many years. The degree of our future
commitment to this reformed Alliance will
depend on the realism of the changes to be
decided and on the degree of responsibility
Europeans will be able to exercise in it, in
the spirit of the new transatlantic partner-
ship that the President of the Republic and
the government are earnestly calling for.
Everybody realises today that NATO must
adjust to the new strategic situation and. in
particular, to the clear assertion of a Euro-
pean identity. "
18. However, the uncertainty weighing upon
the decisions NATO will be required to make
about its own reorganisation in the corning
months. indeed years, makes it hard to envisage
what measures WEU. for its part, may need to
take. But it is clear that these should not entail any
consequences that might throw doubt on the Ame-
rican presence in Europe and continuation of the
defence system and deterrent provided by NATO.
Clearly this concern will be a major factor when it
comes to considering relations between WEU and
the European Union.2. Nouvelles Atlantiques, No. 28 1 1 , 26 April 1996,
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III. WEa and the European Union
19. As far as the European Union is concerned,
the intergovernmental conference which opened
recently in Turin is to define an extension of
Union activities in the area of the common foreign
and security policy, their organisation, and the
way in which European armed forces could serve
that policy. WEU as such is not participating in
the conference but all its member countries are
taking part and on 14 November 1995, in Madrid,
the WEU Council adopted a document which set
out its collective position on the matter. The
Assembly for its part considered the document to
be far from satisfactory as it did not take a clear
position on the essential issues. It therefore held
an extraordinary session in London on22 and23
February last. in order to better express WEU's
point of view on the foreign policy, security and
defence matters to be discussed at the inter-
governmental conference.
20. Your Rapporteur feels that the various sub-
stantive texts adopted in London can fairly be
summarised as follows:
(a) The Assembly of WEU attaches great
importance to the intergovernmental
conference and in February 1996 held
an extraordinary session in order to
express its views on this matter.
(b) It was prompted to do so by the fact that
at its meeting in Madrid in November
1995. the WEU Council of Ministers
discussed the issue but was unable to
do any more than present options. In
contrast, the Assembly arrived at a una-
nimous and constructive position.
(c) The thrust of the Assembly's message
is that the European Union is not ready
to take responsibility for Europe's
defence or for the use of armed forces
to ensure European security.
(i) The accession to the European
Union of three countries that intend
to remain neutral now means that
one third of its members do not
wish to participate in NAIO. This
makes it impossible to establish
proper working relations between
NATO and the European Union.
WEU alone can provide the link
between the two organisations.
(lr) Some members of WEU and the
European Union categorically
refuse to give the Union authority
in matters concerning defence and
armed forces.
(iii) On the face of it, no WEU country
has indicated a willingness to place
its armed forces under the com-
mand of a foreign authority, save
in the case of a massive offensive
against Europe.
21. There is no basis for the argument that the
modified Brussels Treaty is due to expire in 1998
even though the Presidency conclusions on the
European Council meeting held in Turin on
29 March 1996 are an attempt to make the public
believe this is so. The French Government also
used the argument that the Treaty would expire in
1998 in a reply on 18 April 1996 to a question
from Senator About. Your Rapporteur is therefore
grateful to Mr De Decker for having put written
question 336 to the WEU Council on 12 April in
the following terms:
" The Presidency conclusions, issued at the
close of the European Council opening the
intergovernmental conference in Turin on
29 March 1996, contain a passage referring
to 'the deadline of the Brussels Treaty in
1998'.
Can the Council refute the clear implication
or explain how Article XII of the Treaty
would enable a High Contracting Party to
withdraw from a Treaty that had expired? "
22. The Council has not yet replied to this
question. However, when Lord Finsberg asked the
British Government on 16 April 1996 whether the
modified Brussels Treaty:
(a) had a deadline for termination of 1998,
(b) could be denounced by any signatory
after 1998,
(c) could be reviewed in 1998, and
(d) would remain in force unamended until
denunciation or amendment,
Baroness Chalker of Wallasey, Minister of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, replied
as follows:
" Article XII of the modified Brussels
Treaty states that:
'[The Treaty] shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of the last instrument of
ratification and shall remain in force for
fifty years.
After the expiry of the period of fifty years,
each of the High Contracting Parties shall
have the right to cease to be a party thereto
provided that 
-he shall have pre.viouslygiven one year's notice of denunciation to
the Belgian Government'.
As the text of this Article was not amended
by the modification to the Brussels Treaty
in 1954, the Government consider that the
period of fifty years is to be measured from
the date of entry into force of the original
Treaty (25 August 1948). It may be mislead-
ing to suggest that the Treaty has a deadline
6
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of 1998; it is not a deadline for termination.
Instead, from 25 August 1998, each of the
High Contracting Parties may denounce the
Treaty individually. It has always been pos-
sible for the High Contracting Parties to
agree collectively to amend or terminate it.
The expiry of the period of 50 years does not
affect this right in any way. The Treaty will
remain in force, unamended, until such time
as the Parties collectively decide otherwise. "
23. There is probably little point in re-opening
the debate on the question of the date on which
each member country can denounce the Treaty
individually, but reference should be made in this
respect to the very clear position the Assembly
adopted in June 1993 in Recommendation 539 on
the interpretation of Article XII of the modified
Brussels Treaty', in which it recommended the
Council to concur with its juridically-based inter-
pretation of the article, according to which the
1954 Paris Agreements established a new treaty.
24. What is important to note is that the Ger-
man Government, which is one of the most enthus-
iastic advocates of a merger between WEU and
the European Union, gave the following reply on
5 December 1995 to a question put by the ecology
group in the Bundestag:
" The Federal Government considers that
in 1998 no contracting party will avail itself
of the possibility open to it, in accordance
with Article XII.3 of the WEU Treaty, to
denounce the Treaty upon the expiry of the
fifty-year period for which it provides.
However, the expiry of the period of fifty
years opens up the prospect, in political
terms, of a fundamental reorganisation of
relations between the European Union and
Western European Union. "
25. The decision taken at Maastricht to review
the role of WEU prior to that date would seem
reasonable, provided both NATO and the Euro-
pean Union have succeeded in defining their own
roles in the new circumstances.
26. Without prejudging the future organisation
of a European defence, the purpose of the current
strengthening of WEU in the operational field and
above all as regards its defence structures (Plan-
ning Cell, Satellite Centre, Intelligence Section,
Situation Centre, WEAG, commands for the
Mediterranean region) is to provide Europe with
the means it needs for a security and defence
policy.
27. The Assembly considers that WEU can
provide the CFSP with the structures for action
that it at present lacks but the WEU Council must
preserve its political prerogatives so that it can
take action in the event of the CFSP not producing
decisions that are clear enough to define operatio-
nal tasks for WEU. This is a fundamental point as
it has to be considered in the context of the theses
defended mainly by France and Germany, accord-
ing to which WEU would be party to powers the
European Council holds to give general guidance.
According to the French Government's reply on
l8 April 1996 to a question put by Senator
About':
" At the intergovernmental conference,
France will endeavour to secure agreement
for the role of the European Council as the
cornerstone of the European security and
defence system. In such a context it would
be for the European Council to give general
guidance that WEU could use as a basis for
taking action on behalf of the European
Union. which includes the tasks defined by
the WEU Council of Ministers in Peters-
berg. on 19 June 1992."
28. On 7 March this year Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands signed a memorandum
on preparations for the intergovernmental confer-
ence which was similar in its content in that it sta-
ted that between now and the merger between the
European Union and WEU, the three countries
proposed that a very close institutional rapproche-
ment should take place quickly between the two
Unions so that the Council of the European Union
could instruct WEU to give effect to the military
implications of decisions taken in the CFSP by the
Council.
29. The three countries went even further by
asking for the " second pillar of the Maastricht
Treaty " to include Petersberg tasks and collective
defence, on the understanding that responsibility
for its implementation would remain firmly in the
hands of the Atlantic Alliance with which the
European Union was urged to create specific links
in the field of defence.
30. The underlying trend in all these proposals
is towards a subordination of WEU to the Euro-
pean Union, which is not acceptable to the British
Government, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs
reaffirmed to members of the Presidential Com-
mittee on 1 April 1996.
3l . But it is not only the British who have put
forward irrefutable counter-arguments. In WEU
too, they have been used to show that such an
approach does not necessarily promote European
action on security and defence. In an address to the
Royal Institute for International Relations in Brus-
sels on 21 March 1996, Mr Cutileiro, the WEU
Secretary-General, referred to proposals which:
" have in common the fact that they advo-
cate a gradual merger of WEU into the EU.
4. See the Senate's parlamentary debates, Joumol fficiel de
laRdpubliquefrangaise, No. l65 (Q), l8Apnl 1996.3. Document 1369,24 May 1993
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the first step of which would be in effect the
subordination of WEU to the EU, through
the creation of a formal link allowing the
European Union to instruct WEU.
From a practical point of view, it is hard to
see what this would add to the Maastricht
disposition. Although at present the EU can
only 'request' and not 'instruct'. WEU is
bound to accept any request coming from
the EU. Experience has shown that obs-
tacles to a closer cooperation between both
organisations are due not to the absence of
formal links but to the lack of practice of
working together and perhaps also to the
relative weakness of the CFSP.
Equally from a practical standpoint, the
merger of WEU into the EU creates consid-
erable difficulties owing to the fact that
they are based on different treaties and have
different memberships. Proposals to pro-
vide the EU with military competences
postulate 'opt-ins'. 'opt-outs' and compli-
cated arrangements to somehow associate
European allies who are not in the Union.
With due respect for such well-meaning
efforts one cannot help feeling that they
come very close to re-inventing WEU inde-
pendently. "
32. Some recent initiatives such as those taken
by the Finnish and Swedish Foreign Ministers,
designed to confer power on the European Union
to give WEU instructions in the exclusive area of
peacekeeping and crisis management, are proof of
this view. The main problem with such an
approach rs that any crisis situation can easily
degenerate into a collective-defence situation.
33. It remains to be seen whether it will be pos-
sible to narrow the gap between the various posi-
tions, particularly those of Germany and the Uni-
ted Kingdom, whose ministers agreed 
- 
in the
framework of a group of experts 
- 
to specify the
meaning of terms such as " general guidance ",
" guidelines " and " directives "'.
34. However, for as long as five European
Union member countries are not prepared to
accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, it is diffi-
cult to see how they could be given a right, even a
limited one, to issue directives in respect of WEU.
35. The reason why the Assembly attaches
such importance to the WEU Council preserving
its prerogatives and powers of decision (including
at the highest political level), is that it is convin-
ced that WEU is far better suited than the Euro-
pean Union to coordinate the activities of certain
member countries, without any collective deci-
sion, whereas the CFSP, regardless of what its
future decision-making arrangements may be,
will be gripped by paralysis as soon as any serious
differences arise among the participants. The
principle according to which countries refusing to
participate in a particular area of the common
foreign policy would undertake to allow others to
proceed is only valid in cases where opposition is
limited.
36. A special effort must be made to coordinate
WEU and CFSP activities better than in the past.
The results of such coordination, agreed in prin-
ciple at Maastricht, have until now, on the Coun-
cil's own admission, been unimpressive. It
emerges from the Birmingham Declaration, adopt-
ed by the WEU Council on 7 May 1996, that some
specific measures have been taken in this respect.
They include, for the first time, meetings between
WEU and EU working groups on evacuation
planning and Mostar, and a forthcoming meeting
on the Mediterranean. The Declaration also men-
tions certain documents drawn up jointly with the
European Union, dealing with evacuation opera-
tions and peacekeeping in Africa. The Assembly
awaits more detailed information on these texts.
37. It is understandable that neither WEU nor
the European Union wish their practical coopera-
tion arrangements to set precedents that might
prejudice the institutional debate going on in the
intergovernmental conference, but this should not
prevent WEU bodies and the authorities in its
Secretariat-General from insisting on playing a
greater role in CFSP activities.
38. The Assembly has, on a number of occa-
sions, debated whether it is appropriate for the
Council to maintain or modify the policy it adopt-
ed in December l99l on the criteria for the acces-
sion of new member countries to the modified
Brussels Treaty. It is true that opinion in the
Assembly is divided on this subject but your Rap-
porteur would point out that at its extraordinary
session, the Assembly adopted Recommendation
589 in which it asked the Council to:
" Reconsider the Assembly's repeated
requests to permit European members of the
Atlantic Alliance who wish to join WEU as
full members to do so without having to be
full members of the European Union. "
39. This concerns the associate member coun-
tries, namely, Iceland, Norway and Turkey. The
Council has not yet responded to the Recommen-
dation but the Birmingham Declaration shows it
has no intention of changing its policy since it
merely recalled its earlier decisions while recog-
nising " the significant contribution of the asso-
ciate members to the Organisation's work and to
European security and stability as a whole ". The
point should be impressed on the Council that its
policy in respect of the associate members may
have a considerable effect on the will of some of
them to support any eastward enlargement of5 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeinng,3 April 1996
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NATO and WEU. It also has an impact on WEU's
relations with the European Union in that the
more integrated the associate members are in
WEU, the closer they could move to the European
Union.
40. However, there is no tangible sign that the
lack of congmence between the European mem-
bers of NATO, the member countries of the Euro-
pean Union and those of WEU will end in the
foreseeable future. The Birmingham Declaration
clearly shows that the WEU Council has no inten-
tion of taking major initiatives in this respect and
certainly none of taking measures to give the
associate partners' status a considerable boost. As
regards the problem of harmonising the enlarge-
ment of NAIO, the European Union and WEU,
the latter appears to be waiting to see what the
others will do.
41. If the European Union wants to help
achieve a better match between its membership
and that of WEU, it should no longer take in coun-
tries that are not prepared to accede to WEU or
those whose accession to the modified Brussels
Treaty is unacceptable to WEU members. NATO,
for its part, should adopt a similar policy for any
European state applying to accede to the
Washington Treaty.
42. In the prevailing circumstances, the hypo-
thesis of an early merger of WEU with the Euro-
pean Union does not seem feasible, unless the
merger is theoretical, leaving it to WEU to apply
the modified Brussels Treaty with appropriate ins-
truments and a membership that meets the require-
ments of a common defence and joint action in the
interests of European security.
43. It is evident from the many preparatory
documents for the intergovernmental conference
published by many of the governments concern-
ed. several political parties, the Commission of
the European Communities and the European Par-
liament that major differences of principle exist,
particularly regarding whether WEU should be
integrated in the European Union. However it is
not certain that these divergences are such as to
prevent decisions being taken with a bearing on
the immediate future, since a number of specific
proposals can be pursued irrespective of the
framework within which they are finally brought
to completion.
44. Thus the British White Paper, published
early in March 1996, contains evidence of a com-
mitment to maintaining an autonomous WEU but
proposes developing the Organisation's operatio-
nal capability and strengthening a " partnership "
with the European Union, while the Foreign
Ministers of France and Germany, meeting in
Freiburg on 27 February 1996, stated that their
" long-term objective remains WEU's integration
in the European Union. The intergovernmental
conference should lead to clear and specific com-
mitments in this direction ", adding however that
" to this end the process of bringing WEU and the
European Union closer together will be stepped
up ". This corresponds quite closely to the British
proposal for a stronger partnership. Conversely,
most recent statements, whether from the govern-
ments or the main political parties of Ireland,
Sweden, Austria, and even Denmark and Finland,
or from parliamentarians of those countries speak-
ing in the debate on the intergovernmental confe-
rence held in the European Parliament on 14
March 1996, express concern that the European
Union should not be " militarised " and that their
countries should be able to remain outside a
defence Europe. Several representatives of Scan-
dinavian countries have even threatened that their
countries would leave the European Union if it
decided to organise itself in terms of defence.
However such statements do not rule out coopera-
tion between the European Union and WEU.
45. On 19 March 1996, the Prime Minister of
Greece, Mr Simitis, made a statement in the
Greek parliament in favour of WEU being inte-
grated in the European Union, while making clear
that Greece would not abandon its " right of
veto " while it had no commitment that its vital
interests would be guaranteed. He restated that at
the intergovernmental conference, his country
intended to seek the inclusion of solidarity and
mutual assistance clauses in the new treaty. Given
Greece's current understanding of its " vital inter-
ests ", it hardly seems likely that its partners
would enter into commitments, within the frame-
work of the European Union, which they poin-
tedly took care to rule out when Greece acceded
to the modified Brussels Treaty, and it would also
seem that at the end of the day there is only a
slight difference between the United Kingdom's
rejection of any form of qualified majority voting
on foreign policy, security and defence questions
and Greece's support for the principle, accompa-
nied by conditions Greece's partners do not want.
46. It should however be noted that the idea of
including a " solidarity clause " in the new Treaty
on the Union has started to gain acceptance since
the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, first threw
up the idea during the 33rd conference on security
policy, held in Munich on 3 February 1996. At
that time he suggested that all the member coun-
tries of the European Union should benefit from a
solidarity clause similar to the mutual assistance
guarantee in the WEU and NAIO Treaties.
47. This proposal is slightly different from one
of the options studied by the WEU Council,
which is designed to include the Article V clause
of the modified Brussels Treaty in the new Treaty
on the Union or in one of its appended protocols.
It would seem that this solidarity clause is not
intended to be a substitute for Article V given that
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Mr Hoyer, the German Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs and Germany's representative at
the intergovernmental conference, referred on
21 March 1996 to a " clause of political solida-
rity ". It is therefore clear that this idea is still in
the process of germination.
48. Finally, in his address to the XVIIth Confe-
rence of the EDU heads of parties on 13 March
1996 on the line France will be taking at the inter-
governmental conference, the French Prime
Minister, Mr Jupp6, referred to a formula 
-
" enhanced solidarity " 
- 
which might allow seem-
ingly opposing viewpoints to be reconciled.
While rejecting the principle of a " multi-speed "
Europe, the Prime Minister, noting the differing
views expressed, proposed that the new treaty
include a clause explicitly authorising those coun-
tries that so wish to move forward, in their bilate-
ral or multilateral relations, beyond the obliga-
tions contained in the future Treaty on European
Union, in order to enhance solidarity in security
and defence matters through better organisation.
It was clear that Mr Jupp6 had Franco-German
cooperation foremost in mind but that this
" enhanced solidarity " is a fairly accurate des-
cription of what WEU's role and its relations with
the European Union might be in those areas cov-
ered by the application of the modified Brussels
Treaty. It is for the fifteen European Union mem-
ber states to decide what they are prepared to
achieve together. The ten signatory countries of
the modified Brussels Treaty will then have to
consider what they are prepared to do in order to
strengthen solidarity among them, as provided by
the Treaty. This formula therefore offers a fairly
neat definition of WEU's role as it might emerge
from decisions taken by the intergovernmental
conference on behalf of the Fifteen with a view to
European Union enlargement.
49. However, it has to be recognised that the
Assembly will be faced with a serious problem
throughout the intergovernmental conference,
namely, that of not being informed of the progress
of IGC work or the initiatives taken during its
various phases. The European Council has made
detailed arrangements for the European Parlia-
ment to be involved in the work of the conference.
They ensure it is kept informed regularly 
- 
at least
once a month 
- 
and also make provision for an
exchange of views with the President of the Parl-
iament prior to each meeting of the European
Council and IGC ministerial sessions.
50. It is understood that this information is to
cover all the problems discussed at the confer-
ence, which implies that the European Parliament
will be in a position to know about all the discus-
sions concerning WEU's future well before the
WEU Assembly finds out about them. As far as
the Assembly is concerned, any information it
receives will be based on speculation and on
articles in the press. The European Union Presi-
dency has also undertaken to provide national parl-
iaments with information via the Conference of
European Affairs Committees (CEAC), but that
applies only to areas concerning the Community
pillar.
51. This inadmissible situation is aggravated
by the fact that the WEU Council and Secretariat-
General are not even represented at the intergov-
ernmental conference despite the fact that it is
preparing to take fundamental decisions that
concern WEU. The United Kingdom Chairman-
ship-in-Office agreed, at its meeting with the Pres-
idential Committee on I April 1996,that not only
should arrangements be made for the Assembly to
be informed regularly about the work of the IGC
but also that at the conference WEU should be
able to express its points of view as an organisa-
tion.
52. However, no such arrangements have yet
been drawn up and coordinated between the
Council and the Assembly. In order to do so, it
would be appropriate to take as a pattern the
arangements involving the European Parliament
in the work of the conference, with emphasis on
the following requirements:
(a) it goes without saying that the Council
should undertake to inform the Assem-
bly about all meetings discussing the
future of WEU and its future relations
with the European Union;
(b) furthermore, the Council should keep
the Assembly informed of progress in
the conference's work on the CFSP;
(c) the Council should bring to the Assem-
bly's attention all the conference's ins-
titutional discussions that might have
consequences for WEU;
(d) the Council should inform the Assem-
bly about any initiative designed to
strengthen the role of the European Parl-
iament as regards external security, and
also about the work of the intergov-
ernmental conference to determine how
and to what extent national parliaments
could, individually and collectively,
make a greater contribution to the tasks
for which the European Union is res-
ponsible (see paragraph 2 of the
" Turin European Council Presidency
Conclusions ", dated 29 March 1996).
53. To ensure that the Assembly is regularly
informed by the WEU Council, a precise time-
table should be drawn up on the basis of the sched-
ule of work in the conference. To facilitate the
task, such information could be supplied to the
President of the Assembly and to an Assembly
ad hoc group whose composition would need to
l0
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be decided. Furthermore, it would also be a good
idea to request the IGC representative of the
ministry of foreign affairs of the country holding
the presidency of the WEU Council to provide the
Assembly with information.
IV. A programme for WEU
54. Even if, as your Rapporteur believes, the
future of WEU will very much depend on deci-
sions taken by NATO and the European Union,
there is more or less unanimous agreement that
any progress made within WEU towards more
effective organisation of European security and
defence should help both to strengthen NAIO, by
achieving a better political and military balance in
that organisation, and give more weight to the
European Union's common foreign and security
policy by providing it with the military structures
it at present lacks and will no doubt be a long time
acqumng.
55. However, to meet these goals, strong politi-
cal determination and drive is necessary and your
Rapporteur wonders whether it is enough to
assign WEU a " pivotal role " between the Euro-
pean Union and the Atlantic Alliance or to state,
as the WEU Secretary-General did in his address
in Brussels on 21 March 1996, that WEU has
never been a completely independent decision-
making body. Such an approach is hardly likely to
foster a spirit of political initiative within the
Council, which is nonetheless essential if progress
is to be made in the direction described in the pre-
vious paragraph.
56. There are three areas in which such pro-
gress in WEU can be envisaged: foreign policy,
operational capability, and military structures.
Clearly, any ambitions WEU may have in the field
of foreign policy are limited by the prospects that
might open up for the CFSP. However, it should
not be forgotten that while those prospects looked
even better after the signature of the Maastricht
Treaty, little progress has in fact been made since.
Today, it is considered good taste to attribute this
failure to the weakness of institutions and govern-
ments are turning their thoughts to the sort of
figurehead they might wish to see directing the
CFSP secretariat with a view to imposing on them
a " common will " they would be incapable of
displaying by themselves, or to the idea of giving
the country holding the CFSP presidency a more
dynamic role possibly in association with both its
predecessor and its successor. It is probably not
for WEU to say which would be the better solu-
tion but its Assembly can assert that it is not by
creating institutions that Europe will be able to
compensate for a lack of political will and impose
on governments European views that would not
necessarily be those held by Europeans them-
selves.
57 . A number of recent events have shown that
Europeans do not have the same ideas about secu-
rity and defence requirements. Mr Major's
address to the extraordinary session of the WEU
Assembly, closely followed by his government's
White Paper, have made it perfectly clear that
NATO is the be all and end all in any United
Kingdom defence policy. In contrast, the official
French line, even since France decided to become
re-involved in a number of NAIO bodies, stresses
the European dimension of the new defence
policy the country is in the process of formula-
ting, making it quite clear that by " European " it
means a policy that is distinct from that of the
United States. The positions of the other member
countries of WEU lie somewhere between these
two extremes but the attitude most of them adopt-
ed on the French nuclear tests in the summer of
1995 and their lack of enthusiasm for Mr Jupp6's
proposals on " concerted deterrence " show they
have no intention of following French policy,
however European it might claim to be.
58. In addition, now that the European Union
has grown to its present size, not all Europeans
have the same view of threats to peace. The Medi-
terranean countries have drawn up a number of
initiatives designed to ensure greater European
security in their region. The countries in northern
Europe have had some difficulty in following suit.
The prospects of European Union enlargement to
the east are giving rise to similar differences. The
defence commitments of some of them outside
Europe, mainly 
- 
but not exclusively 
- 
in Africa,
are perceived by others as national commitments
only.
59. There are grounds for hope that progress on
European economic integration and improved
exchanges will gradually lead to a convergence of
the various points of view but as things stand in
Europe today, the facts have to be accepted. While
the presence of a leading political figure at the
head of the CFSP secretariat might possibly help
to produce compromises, it will not force states or
their populations to subscribe to a common vision
of Europe's responsibilities in the world at large.
60. Your Rapporteur is nonetheless anxious to
take account of the points of view expressed by
several members of the Political Committee, at its
meeting in London on 1 April 1996. They effec-
tively supported the British position that the emi-
nent person to be appointed head of the CFSP
secretariat should not be a politician but someone
responsible for implementing the decisions of the
Council of the European Union. This whole
debate and the results of the intergovernmental
conference might have important implications for
the role of the Secretary-General of WEU. It is
absolutely essential therefore that the Assembly
should receive regular information on these insti-
tutional issues.
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61. It is necessary for the structures in Europe's
foreign, security and defence policy to be suffi-
ciently flexible to allow some countries to take
action without requiring all of them to become
involved. This is why our Assembly deemed it
necessary for the WEU Council to retain respon-
sibility for foreign policy and considered that
even if WEU is able to make its armed forces
available to the CFSP, it should still be able to for-
mulate its own policy according to its own proce-
dures.
62. In this respect, two of the WEU Council's
subsidiary bodies could develop their activities to
good advantage. The Institute for Security Studies
was set up to promote awareness among Euro-
peans about their common interests in WEU areas
of responsibility. It is intended to become an
" academy " although the Council has yet to
define unanimously and satisfactorily exactly
what this label is supposed to mean. It is no doubt
time for the Council to explain what it plans to do
with the Institute, not because the work the latter
has done to date is open to criticism, but because
setting common security and defence objectives
for Europeans and deciding on activities designed
to familiarise the public with them appear to be
taking on new importance in the present circum-
stances. Furthermore, the Assembly has very little
information about the Institute's role as a think
tank for the Council 
- 
the Birmingham Declara-
tion contains but a single sentence on the subject
- 
but it would seem that this role could be devel-
oped to turn the Institute into an analysis and fore-
casting centre comparable with the one being sug-
gested for the CFSP. In this respect, your
Rapporteur does not share fears that have been
expressed that once the Institute has undergone
this transformation, it may duplicate the CFSP
analysis and forecasting centre, which at present
is still only a project. The two institutions should
be complementary and their longer-term develop-
ment will depend on the way in which the rela-
tionship between WEU and the European Union
develops after the intergovernmental conference.
63. WEU's operational role will mainly depend
on the decisions the NATO Council is due to take
in June 1996. Whatever the outcome, it is clear
that the hypothesis of organising Europe's
defence using European means alone will not be
contemplated but that the fear of engendering a
situation in which it is obliged to provide such
means will weigh heavily on joint decisions. In
any event it should be noted that one of the more
detailed sections of the Birmingham Declaration
deals with the many aspects of WEU's operational
development.
64. The area in which the NATO Council
should take real initiatives of direct concern to
WEU is that of the CJTF which, once properly
formed, would constitute the only means for mili-
tary action by Europe whether for its defence or
for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions.
In fact, it is WEU's actual capability to deploy its
armed forces that will be at issue because in
Europe the deployment of any forces, whether
national or multinational, increasingly requires
the use of assets that only NATO has. The only
exception to this is the case of operations that are
limited in time, space and above all in terms of the
means employed. In this respect, both the British
White Paper and the Prime Minister, Mr John
Major, when addressing the Assembly on
23 February 1996, have specified that the United
Kingdom can conceive of no intervention by
WEU other than in such cases since anything
more important had to come under NATO's res-
ponsibility.
65. This is no doubt a minimalist view of the
possibilities open to Europe, which some of the
United Kingdom's partners will perhaps have dif-
ficulty in accepting. But until now, WEU has not
been able to acquire the means to do much more,
mainly because of government limitations on the
development and autonomy of the Planning Cell.
The accompanying creation of a Situation Centre
and Intelligence Section is not sufficient for the
Cell to function as a proper headquarters able to
prepare for the deployment of armed forces in any
circumstances imaginable. It is probably not
appropriate at present to speculate about any
significant development of its resources and capa-
bilities. What information is available about pre-
parations for the June meeting of the NATO
Council of Ministers gives no reason to suggest
there will be any, and the priority all WEU mem-
ber countries give to NATO as Europe's defence
organisation will not prompt them to press very
hard for WEU initiatives in this area.
66. In contrast, the notion of structures for a
European defence opens the door to a long-term
task, the result of which should be to give WEU in
the first instance, and Europe thereafter, the
means for a genuine security and defence policy
as provided for in Articl e J .4.1 . of the Maastricht
Treaty. With Germany having joined the Helios 2
programme and four other countries having join-
ed the Horus programme, and with the commis-
sioning of the Helios I satellite and the develop-
ment of the Torrej6n Satellite Centre, an
ambitious European military observation satellite
programme is under way. Despite the problems
posed by France's withdrawal from the FLA pro-
ject, the proposal put forward in 1989 by Mr Gen-
scher, the then German Foreign Minister, to equip
Europe with strategic mobility instruments, is still
being studied and should produce results over the
next few years. France's decision to abandon
conscription and opt for professional armed
forces should significantly increase European
rapid force projection capabilities over the years
ahead.
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67. In addition, even though it is proving a very
slow process, the plan to transform the WEAG
into a European Armaments Agency with exten-
sive authority and, more significantly, legal
powers, will be a major step towards streamlining
armaments production in Europe and, above all,
towards standard equipment for all WEU forces,
thus making for more effective deployment in the
event of a crisis.
68. Your Rapporteur therefore attaches special
importance to ventures such as these, which are
designed for the long term, since he considers that
at the present time, Europe is not ready to reach
the agreement necessary for developing a com-
mon defence policy and does not have the where-
withal that is essential for any joint military action
outside NATO. It would be pointless to waste time
and energy in defending the principle of such a
policy for as long as the requisite political condi-
tions are not fulfilled and military means remain
extremely inadequate.
69. This outline of a programme for WEU
would be incomplete if it did not take account of
the parliamentary dimension of building Europe
and the problems it raises. With regard to relations
between the Assembly of WEU and the European
Parliament, it does not seem possible to overcome
the main difficulties and establish relations on the
basis of mutual recognition and the principle of
full reciprocity. More flexible arrangements have,
however, been found to allow regular information
to be exchanged between rapporteurs and bet-
ween liaison groups set up within the two assem-
blies.
10. The attendance of a WEU parliamentary
delegation, consisting of the chairmen of political
groups and led by Mr de Puig, Chairman of the
Political Committee, at a public hearing entitled
" Towards a European Security Structure ", organ-
ised in Brussels on 19 March last, was felt to have
been one of the most constructive such arrange-
ments and gave the representatives of the WEU
Assembly a good opportunity to express their
points of view. A meeting with Mr Tindemans,
Rapporteur of the European Parliament, also pro-
ved very worthwhile and it is planned, through
these informal contracts, to establish regular
exchanges of views between rapporteurs of the
two assemblies within the relevant committees.
'71. The context for relations between the
Assembly and the European Parliament is in fact
more general as they are linked to the creation of
a parliamentary dimension in a reformed Euro-
pean Union 
- 
a subject for discussion at the inter-
governmental conference. The Assembly will
need to follow this debate very closely and make
its position on the issue clear. In order to do so, it
might draw, inter alia, on a very interesting docu-
ment on the European institutions, produced in
December 1995 by the Tindemans group, which
presents five options or scenarios, three of which
suggest using parliamentary models based on the
principle of a second chamber. This issue is
highly topical and should therefore be examined
closely by our Assembly.
V. Conclusions
12. The reason why WEU continues to have a
role to play is that it is the most appropriate Euro-
pean organisation for preparing and conductingjoint action by states that implement foreign and
above all security and defence policy individually.
It would be wrong to assimilate the security and
defence sector to that of the economy in which
there are forces that work in favour of the creation
of an economic area and the adoption of common
rules. It is pointless to hope that the obstacles to
union will be overcome if things are allowed to go
their own way. There will be no European defence
w'ithout a fundamental political decision and
everything, including the document adopted by
the WEU Council of Ministers on 14 November
1995, indicates that such a decision has not yet
been taken. Until this changes, WEU's flexible
structures remain the most appropriate for dealing
with the situation. They also enable those who so
wish to pursue technical objectives which, in due
course, should facilitate the political decision.
73. In view of this situation. the outcome of the
ministerial Council meeting in Birmingham on
7 May 1996 is disappointing. It gives the clear
impression that the Council is focusing its work
primarily on purely technical and organisational
issues when it should be endeavouring to give
political impetus to efforts to solve the various
problems concerning the European Union and the
Atlantic Alliance. If WEU considers that one of
its main tasks is to strengthen the European Union
and the Atlantic Alliance, it should be doing more
to defend its own vision and proposals within
those organisations and usher in a change in the
situation rather than sitting back and waiting for
others to take action.
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